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Abstract
We examine whether the predictions of minimax in zero-sum games holds under highly
incentivized conditions with highly informed informed decision makers. We examine data
from 3455 National Football League (NFL) games from the 2000 season through the 2012
season. We categorize every relevant play as either a rush or a pass. We nd that, despite
the predictions of minimax, the pass-rush mix exhibits negative serial correlation. In other
words, given the conditions of the play, teams employ an exploitable strategy in that play
types alternate more frequently than implied by an independent stochastic process. We
also nd that the e¢ cacy of plays are a¤ected by previous actions and previous outcomes
in a manner that is not consistent with minimax. Our analysis suggests that teams could
prot from more clustered play selections, which switch play type less frequently. Our
results are consistent with the explanation that teams excessively switch play types in
order to not be perceived as predictable.
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1 Introduction
In two-player, zero-sum games with a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, it is in-
cumbent on the players to mix according to minimax. In particular, the mixing cannot be
predictable, otherwise a player could devise a strategy to exploit an opponent who does not
properly mix.
A natural question is whether observed mixed strategies occur as predicted by minimax.
Although it is well-known that people have di¢ culty detecting and producing random se-
quences of the sort required for the execution of minimax,1 research shows that there are
di¤erences between the generation of such sequences in decision problems and strategic set-
tings.2 However, laboratory evidence suggests that mixing often does not occur as predicted,
particularly when the data is analyzed at the individual level.3
On the other hand, these studies are vulnerable to the critique that subjects do not have
su¢ cient material incentives to employ a strategy that cannot be exploited and they do not
have su¢ cient incentives to detect an exploitable strategy of their opponent. Further, due
to their unfamiliarity with the strategic issues, the subjects might lack the experience to
adequately play the game.
Rather than investigate this question in the laboratory, we go to the eld, literally. We
examine strategic decisions in the National Football League (NFL). We observe the type
of play called by the teams and investigate whether the sequence of plays conforms to the
predictions of minimax. While we acknowledge that the laboratory has certain advantages
over the eld, it is also the case that our setting exhibits advantages over the laboratory.
NFL head coaches are paid large salaries and are under intense pressure to win, as evidenced
by their frequent employment terminations. They also can make their decisions through
1For instance, see Wagenaar (1972), Bar-Hillel, and Wagenaar (1991), Rabin (2002), and Oskarsson, Van
Boven, McClelland, and Hastie (2009).
2See Rapoport and Budescu (1992) and Budescu and Rapoport (1994).
3Since ONeill (1987) and the reexamination of the original data by Brown and Rosenthal (1990) there
has been mixed evidence regarding mixed strategies in the laboratory. This literature includes Batzilis et al.
(2013), Binmore, Swierzbinski, and Proulx (2001), Geng, Peng, Shachat, and Zhong (2014), Mookherjee and
Sopher (1994, 1997), ONeill (1991), Ochs (1995), Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2008), Rapoport and Amaldoss
(2000, 2004), Rapoport and Boebel (1992), Rosenthal, Shachat, and Walker (2003), Shachat (2002), Van Essen
and Wooders (2013).
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conferring with other members of the coaching sta¤.4 Further, their decisions are not made
without su¢ cient deliberation, as each team makes detailed plans specic to the game.
We nd that, despite these incentives for success, the level of expertise, the ability to
consult others, and the ability to make detailed plans prior to the game, play calling exhibits
negative serial correlation. We also nd that, according to two measures, the e¢ cacy of plays
are a¤ected by previous actions and previous outcomes. In other words, teams excessively
switch play types and this has negative consequences for the e¢ cacy of the plays. Our results
suggest that teams could prot from more clustered play sequences, which switch play type
less frequently.
While the literature, which nds that people have di¢ culty producing statistically in-
dependent sequences, can explain the negative serial correlation, it seems to not provide a
satisfactory explanation for the reduced e¢ cacy of plays associated with the negative serial
correlation. In fact, our results are consistent with the explanation that the defenses expect
the negative serial correlation exhibited by the o¤enses. This seems to be the case because
clustered plays have a larger e¢ cacy. This leads to the question of why the o¤ense would
elect to employ an exploitable strategy that exhibits negative serial correlation. It is possible
that the o¤enses excessively switch in order to appear "unpredictable" to people (fans, owners,
etc.) who have trouble detecting statistically independent sequences. It could also be the
case that this e¤ect is larger than the negative consequences that arise from the negative serial
correlation. Therefore, our analysis is consistent with the view that teams want to be viewed
as unpredictable and that they accept the reduced e¢ cacy of their plays resulting from the
negative serial correlation.
1.1 Background details of football
American football (hereafter referred to as football) is contested on a 100 yard5 long rectangular
eld. Two competing teams of eleven players attempt to advance a ball towards the others
end zone, located at opposite ends of the eld. Teams receive six points from a touchdown,
4Okano (2013) nds that behavior in a repeated game with a unique mixed strategy equilibrium is closer
to the minimax prediction when teams of two play rather than when individuals play.
5One yard is the equivalent of 0.9144 meters.
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by advancing the ball into their opponents end zone, and three points from a eld goal, by
kicking the ball through a set of elevated goal posts over their opponents end zone.
Football is unique among sports in two respects. First, there is a clearer distinction
between o¤ense and defense than in other sports. There is a stoppage in play each time
possession of the ball transfers from one team to the other, and teams nearly always replace
all eleven players when this occurs. Second, the action is broken into discrete units called
plays. The o¤ensive team increases its chance of scoring points, and therefore winning the
game, by advancing the ball towards the defensive teams end zone. The distance to the
defensive teams end zone is referred to as eld position.
When a team has possession of the ball, it has four plays, called rst down through fourth
down, to advance the ball a total of ten yards. These plays are referred to as plays from
scrimmage. If the team succeeds in advancing ten yards, an achievement also referred to as
a rst down, the o¤ensive team gets another set of four downs to advance the ball another
ten yards. If they fail to net ten yards in a set of four plays, the ball is awarded to the other
team.6 The number of yards that the o¤ensive team needs to advance in order to achieve a
rst down is called the distance. The sequence of plays where only one team possess the ball
is referred to as a possession.
From an analytic perspective, an attractive aspect of football is that the beginning of each
play can be well-characterized by the score, down, distance, and eld position. There is an
extremely large number of strategies that teams can employ for a specied play. For the
o¤ense, those plays fall into two categories: a pass or a rush. A pass is a play in which one
player7 attempts to throw the ball forward to another player, who attempts to catch it. A
rush is a play in which a player attempts to advance the ball by carrying it.
It is important that the o¤ense and defense are not predictable by the opposition. If
the defense knew the play called by the o¤ense, they could devise a strategy to best defend
against the play. If the o¤ense knew the strategy of the defense, they could devise a play
6The o¤ensive team has the option to "punt," or kick the ball down the eld, surrendering the ball to the
other team. Teams often employ the punt on fourth down, making third down e¤ectively the nal opportunity
to complete the ten yards. See Romer (2006) for more on the decision to punt on fourth down.
7Nearly always, this passing player is the quarterback.
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to best attack the defense. In short, the play called by the o¤ense and the strategy of the
defense needs to selected in an unpredictable manner. While we do not observe the strategy
employed by the defense, we do observe whether the play of the o¤ense is a pass or a rush.
We are interested in whether the pass-rush mix is consistent with the predictions of minimax.8
To facilitate an understanding of the following analysis, we describe a few additional details
of the game. If a team violates one of the rules of the game then the o¢ cials call a penalty.
Penalties can be categorized as either a dead ball penalty, where the play is not allowed to
continue and must be repeated, or a live ball penalty, where the play is allowed to continue
to completion.9 For our purposes, the distinction is important in that we can observe the
type of play called on a live ball penalty, but not on a dead ball penalty. Additionally, we
note that the game is divided into four quarters of 15 minutes. Play is stopped at the end of
the second quarter and in the third quarter the game is restarted under di¤erent conditions
than those at the end of the second quarter. The game ends at the end of the fourth quarter.
Therefore, we refer to the end of the second and fourth quarters as the end of play.
1.2 Related Literature
We have seen that laboratory studies do not nd strong evidence that subjects play mixed
strategies according to minimax. However, these studies are vulnerable to the criticism that
laboratory subjects face relatively small material incentives and do not possess the experience
necessary to adequately mix. In response to this critique, there is a growing literature that
examines mixed strategies in a sports setting. These studies have the advantage that the
participants face large material incentives for success and the participants have a great deal
of experience in these settings.10
8We acknowledge that, while the coaches are one source of the called play, it is also the case that many
teams allow the o¤ensive players to change the play after viewing the alignment of the defense. Our data set
does not allow us to distinguish between these possibilities. Therefore, we simply regard the decision making
unit as the team.
9For live ball penalties, the o¤ended team generally has the option to either accept the penalty and replay
the down, or to decline the penalty and accept the result of the play. Below, we refer to accepted live ball
penalties as simply live ball penalties.
10Goldman and Rao (2013) nd that professional basketball players are largely successful at solving the
complex optimization problem regarding the decision to shoot or wait for a better shot before the time in which
the team is required to shoot.
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Walker and Wooders (2001) examine the direction of serves in professional tennis matches.
The authors nd that the probability of success for serves to the right and serves to the left
are not di¤erent, which is consistent with the predictions of minimax. However, the authors
note that the serves exhibit negative serial correlation, whereby the direction of a serve is not
independent of the direction of the previous serve. Hsu, Huang, and Tang (2007) preform a
similar analysis on a di¤erent tennis data set. In contrast to Walker and Wooders (2001), the
authors do not nd evidence of serial correlation of serves.
Other papers examine the direction of penalty kicks in soccer. The evidence largely sup-
ports the contention that the participants mix according to minimax (Chiappori, Levitt, and
Groseclose, 2002; Palacios-Huerta, 2003; Coloma, 2007; Azar and Bar-Eli, 2011; Buzzacchi
and Pedrini, 2014). In contrast, Bar-Eli et al. (2007) examine the behavior of soccer goal-
keepers in a penalty kick, where the action choice is either to dive to the left, dive to the right,
or stay in the middle of the goal. The authors nd that the frequency with which goalkeepers
stay in the middle is excessively small. The authors interpret this as an Action Bias, whereby
the goalkeepers have a preference to be perceived as doing something to attempt to keep the
goal from being scored, despite that this is suboptimal for the purposes of preventing the
goal.11
To our knowledge, there are two previous studies that investigate serial correlation in
the pass-rush mix in football, Kovash and Levitt (2009) and McGarrity and Linnen (2010).
McGarrity and Linnen (2010) examine play calling while restricting attention to rst downs
with a distance of ten yards. Their data is taken from 11 NFL teams during the 2006 season.
The authors perform a perform a test of runs for serial independence. Based on their analysis,
the authors can only reject serial independence for one of the 11 teams. The authors argue
that their data support the claim that play calling largely does not exhibit serial correlation.
By contrast, the analysis of our more extensive data is consistent with the claim that there is
serial correlation in play calling and that it leads to plays with lower e¢ cacy.
11Another line of research investigates whether the ability to mix according to minimax in a familiar strategic
setting in the eld translates to the ability to mix properly in an unfamiliar strategic setting in the laboratory.
We note that the conclusions in this literature are not uncontroversial (see Levitt, List, and Reiley, 2010;
Palacios-Huerta and Volij, 2008; Van Essen and Wooders, 2013; Wooders, 2010).
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As we do, Kovash and Levitt (2009) nd negative serial correlation across plays. We di¤er
from these authors in that we employ di¤erent measures of the e¢ cacy of a play. Kovash and
Levitt estimate the expected number of points, given any prole of down, distance, and eld
position. Their measure of e¢ cacy entails calculating the di¤erence in the expected points
before and after every play. By contrast, our measures are more standard (yards gained and
whether the play was successful according to a standard measure) and we explicitly control
for the prole of down, distance, and eld position in our econometric specication. We favor
the measures which we use over the expected points measure because the "true value" of the
latter will vary by team, by year, and even by the available personnel. There are additional
di¤erences as Kovash and Levitt compare the e¢ cacy of a rush and a pass, and conclude
that the play calling violates minimax. By contrast, our examination of minimax does not
compare the di¤erences in outcomes between a pass and a rush, but rather we study whether
the e¢ cacy of plays are a¤ected by previous outcomes in a manner that is not consistent with
minimax.
2 Data
2.1 Overview
Our data was obtained from http://armchairanalysis.com for a small fee. The data was taken
from each regular season and playo¤ game from the 2000 season through the 2012 season.
The data set contains 562; 564 plays from 3455 games. As is standard in the literature that
examines football data,12 we restrict attention to situations in which the game is neither
a¤ected by the end of play nor a¤ected by a large score di¤erential. Therefore, we exclude
from our analysis plays that occurred in the last 2 minutes of the second quarter, plays that
occurred in the fourth quarter,13 and plays that occurred when the absolute value of the point
di¤erence14 was 22 points or greater. After also excluding non-scrimmage plays (kicko¤s,
12For instance, see Romer (2006) and Kovash and Levitt (2009).
13 If the game is tied at the end of the fourth quarter, the teams go on to play an additional period referred
to as overtime. We also exclude plays that occurred in overtime.
14We calculate this by subtracting the score of the defense from the score of the o¤ense.
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punts, eld goal attempts, extra points, and two-point conversions), we have 257; 782 plays
from scrimmage and 267; 584 o¤ensive play decisions.
From a brief description of the play, we categorize each play as either a rush or a pass.
Most of our categorizations should not be controversial and are identical to that provided
by the data set. We do, however, categorize a "lateral pass" as a pass, whereas the o¢ cial
records categorize this as a rush. Further, we categorize any play in which an illegal forward
pass penalty is called as a pass and not a rush. Finally, we categorize quarterback sacks as a
pass, since the play is a failed pass play.
In addition to the down, distance, and eld position of each play, our data includes the
home team, the current score, the betting point spread, and whether there was a penalty on
the play. Further, our data includes the conditions of the game: a characterization of the
weather and wind conditions, and whether the game was played on grass or articial turf.
We also include two di¤erent measures of the e¢ cacy of a play. The rst measure we use
is the number of yards gained by the play. The second measure we use is whether the play is
successful according to the standard measure: if on 1st down, 40% of the distance is gained,
on 2nd down, 60% of the distance is gained, and on 3rd and 4th downs, 100% of the distance
is gained.15 Finally, we dene a play as a failure if one yard or less is gained.
2.2 Di¤erent specications of the previous play
As this paper explores serial correlation in NFL play calling, the classication of the previous
play is crucial. First we note that if a play is the rst of a possession then we do not assign it
a previous play. However, if the play is not the rst of a possession then we possibly assign it
a previous play. Due to the nature of penalties in football, there are several ways to determine
the previous play. In the remainder of this subsection, we carefully describe the four that
we employ in the analysis. We employ four distinct denitions since we want our results to
be robust to the precise denition of the previous play. The reader who is not interested in
these details can skip the remainder of this subsection, keeping in mind that we employ four
distinct denitions, each of which imply a di¤erent number of observations.
15This standard measure was included in the original data set.
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One way to consider the previous play is based on whether there is a dead ball penalty on
the play or on the proceeding plays. If a dead ball penalty is called on a play then the play is
not assigned a previous play. If it is neither the case that a dead ball penalty is called on the
play nor called on the proceeding play then we assign the type given to the proceeding play. If
there was a dead ball penalty in the proceeding play but not the play proceeding that, then we
use the play type assigned to the play before the penalty. If the two proceeding plays involved
dead ball penalties then we assign the play type given to the play proceeding the rst dead
ball penalty. We continue in this manner for any number of consecutive dead ball penalties.
We therefore include the information obtained from plays in which a live ball penalty was
called and the teams consider the information learned prior to the dead ball penalties. We
describe this specication as Previous 1. There are 209; 963 plays from scrimmage with an
observation involving Previous 1.
Another way to consider the previous play is done as in Previous 1, except that plays
following dead ball penalties are not assigned previous plays. In other words, here the teams
do not consider information prior to a dead ball penalty. We describe this specication as
Previous 2. There are 203; 791 plays from scrimmage with an observation involving Previous
2.
An additional way to consider the previous play is done as Previous 1, except that infor-
mation observed in plays with a live ball penalty is not used. In other words, if it is neither
the case that a penalty was called on the play nor called on the proceeding play then we assign
the type given to the proceeding play. If there was a penalty in the proceeding play but not
the play proceeding that, then we use the play type assigned to the play before the penalty. If
the two proceeding plays involved penalties then we simply assign the play type given to the
play proceeding the rst penalty. We continue in this manner for any number of consecutive
penalties. We describe this variable as Previous 3. There are 202; 329 plays from scrimmage
with an observation involving Previous 3.
Finally, one could consider the previous play as in Previous 3, except that plays following
penalties are not assigned previous plays. In other words, here the teams do not consider the
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information learned prior to a penalty. We describe this variable as Previous 4. There are
194; 860 plays from scrimmage with an observation involving Previous 4.
We summarize the di¤erences among these four techniques in Table 1, where a check
indicates that it satises the criteria.
Table 1 Summary of the di¤erences among previous play classications
Previous 1 Previous 2 Previous 3 Previous 4
1. Include live ball penalties X X
2. Include plays following live X X X
ball penalties
Following a live ball penalty:
2a. previous play is the most X X
recent live ball penalty
2b. previous play is the most X
recent non-penalized play
3. Include plays following dead X X
ball penalties
To illustrate the di¤erences between the previous classications, consider the following
example. The rst play of the possession is a pass. The second is a rush. The third is a live
ball penalty on a pass play. The fourth play is a rush. The fth play is a dead ball penalty.
The sixth and seventh plays are passes. Table 2 illustrates the di¤erences in the previous
classications in this example.
Table 2 An example sequence of plays and the corresponding previous classications
Play Play Type Previous 1 Previous 2 Previous 3 Previous 4
1 Pass        
2 Rush Pass Pass Pass Pass
3 Pass-Live ball penalty Rush Rush    
4 Rush Pass Pass Rush  
5 No play-Dead ball penalty        
6 Pass Rush   Rush  
7 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass
Note that the di¤erence between Previous 1 and 3 lies in whether information about the
play call for a live ball penalty is considered. The di¤erence between Previous 1 and 2 lies
in whether information prior to a dead ball penalty is considered. The di¤erence between
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Previous 3 and 4 lies in whether information prior to any penalty is considered. Finally, note
that in the fourth play of the possession, Previous 1 and 2 have a di¤erent assignment than
Previous 3. This is because Previous 1 and 2 consider information that the previous play,
which was given a live ball penalty, was a pass play. In contrast, Previous 3 disregards the
information of the play call in the live ball penalty but considers information learned prior to
the play call in the live ball penalty. Therefore, Previous 3 categorizes the previous play as
a rush and not a pass.
3 Results
3.1 Summary statistics
In the analysis below, our independent variables include the down, the distance, the eld
position,16 the point di¤erence, and the di¤erence between the point di¤erence and the betting
point spread. In order to account for the particular matchup between the teams, we include
the fraction of plays that were passes by the o¤ense within the particular game, the yards per
pass earned within the game, the yards per rush earned within the game, and the fraction of
plays within the game that were considered a success. We o¤er a summary of several key
independent variables in Table 3.
Table 3 Summary statistics
Mean SD Min Max
Down 1:786 0:800 1 4
Distance 8:584 3:833 1 48
Fraction of pass plays in game 0:562 0:112 0:123 0:891
Fraction of successful plays in game 0:447 0:082 0:0952 0:773
Yards earned per pass in game 6:140 1:951  0:500 19:818
Yards earned per rush in game 4:046 1:270  2:375 13:562
Point di¤erence  0:790 7:786  21 21
Play was a failure 0:380 0:485 0 1
We list the summary statistics for several key independent variables. The
mean and standard deviation calculations are performed on the play-level rather
16We treat this as a categorical variable indicating whether the play originated 81 or more yards from their
goal, between 51 and 80 yards, between 50 and 21 yards, between 20 and 6, or 5 yards or less.
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than the game-level. The data includes 257; 782 observations. We note that these
calculations include plays which do not have a previous play.
We also describe the di¤erences between pass plays and rush plays. We use two measures
of these types of plays: yards gained by the play and whether the play was successful. We
summarize this comparison in Table 4.
Table 4 Comparison between pass and rush
Yards Successful
Mean SD Mean SD
Pass 6:212 10:158 0:443 0:497
Rush 4:264 6:357 0:458 0:498
z-statistic  7:57 8:09
p-value < 0:001 < 0:001
We provide the mean and standard deviation of both the yards gained and
whether the play was a success, by play type. We also report the results of Mann-
Whitney tests of the di¤erence between rush and pass plays. The data includes
257; 782 observations, involving 139; 302 pass plays and 118; 480 rush plays. Note
that these calculations include plays which do not have a previous play.
We note that pass plays, on average, gain more yards than rush plays, though rush plays
more often satisfy our denition of a successful play.17 These two di¤erences are signicant
according to Mann-Whitney tests. We also note that, while pass plays have a signicantly
larger mean of yards gained, they also have a larger standard deviation of yards gained as
measured by an F-test of the equality of variances (F (139301; 118479) = 2:55, p < 0:001).
3.2 Serial correlation
We now move to the rst of our primary research questions, whether the pass-rush mix exhibits
serial correlation. Our dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the
play is a pass, and a 0 otherwise. Due to the binary nature of our dependent variable, we
run logistic regressions. Our independent variables include the down, the distance, the eld
17For more on the optimality of the fraction of rush plays and pass plays, see Alamar (2006, 2010), Reed,
Critcheld, and Martens (2006), Rockerbie (2008), Kovash and Levitt (2009), and Stilling and Critcheld
(2010).
12
position, the point di¤erence, the di¤erence between the point di¤erence and the betting point
spread, the fraction of plays that were passes by the o¤ense within the particular game, the
yards per pass earned within the game, the yards per rush earned within the game, and the
fraction of plays within the game that were considered a success. Additionally, we account
for various observables, such as whether the game was played in excessively cold conditions,18
excessively windy conditions,19 wet conditions,20 whether the game was played on grass,21
and whether the o¤ense was also the home team. We include team-season xed-e¤ects in our
regressions. We run four regressions, one for each of our four techniques for determining the
previous play. We summarize this analysis in Table 5.
Table 5 Logistic regressions of serial correlation: Play is a pass
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Previous pass  0:312  0:318  0:317  0:330
(0:00558) (0:00567) (0:00567) (0:00581)
Previous failure 0:00495  0:00848  0:0217  0:0564
(0:00735) (0:00761) (0:00738) (0:00798)
Previous pass * Previous failure  0:0998  0:106  0:111  0:120
(0:0055) (0:0056) (0:00559) (0:00575)
 2 Log L 251135:17 243935:06 241845:61 232354:56
LR 2 36918:69 35950:42 35952:54 35187:45
Observations 209; 963 203; 791 202; 329 194; 860
We do not list the estimates of the other independent variables, the estimate
of the intercept, or the estimates of the team-season xed-e¤ects. Note that 
indicates signicance at p < 0:1,  indicates signicance at p < 0:01, and 
indicates signicance at p < 0:001.
First, we note that in each of the four specications, the previous pass variable is negative
and signicant. This suggests that a pass is less likely to be called following a pass play.
We also note that the Previous pass-Previous failure interaction estimate is negative and
18We have two categories: if the temperature is less than 20 Fahrenheit (-6.67 Celsius) or if it is greater than
20 degrees Fahrenheit but less than 30 Fahrenheit (-1.1 Celsius).
19We have two categories: if the wind speed is higher than 30 miles per hour (mph) or if it is less than 30
mph but higher than 20 mph.
20We note whether the description of the game included a mention of snow, rain, or urries.
21See Bailey and McGarrity (2012) for an example of an analysis which also considers the playing surface.
Unlike these authors, we do not nd a signicant e¤ect.
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signicant in each of the four specications. This suggests that a pass is particularly less
likely to be called following a failed pass play.
We note that this negative serial correlation is not consistent with the predictions of
minimax. For example, after controlling for all other factors, we nd that a pass is less likely
if the previous play was a pass, especially if the previous play failed. However, it remains to
be seen whether this negative serial correlation a¤ects the e¢ cacy of the plays.
3.3 Serial correlation and yards gained
Above, we nd negative serial correlation in the pass-rush mix. However, it is important to
discern whether this pattern has an appreciable impact on the e¢ cacy of those plays. As
we do not have data on the strategy of the defensive team, we examine whether the observed
negative serial correlation is a best response to the unobserved strategy of the defense.
We begin our analysis with yards gained as the dependent variable. We include dummy
variables indicating whether the play is a pass, whether the previous play was a failure, and
whether the play type is the same type (rush or pass) as the previous play. As described
above, we use four methods to specify the previous play. As in the analysis summarized
by Table 5, we include team-seasons xed-e¤ects. In addition to these variables, we also
include the control variables that were used in the analysis summarized in Table 5. We
summarize this analysis in Table A1, in the appendix. Given the analysis summarized in
Table A1, we estimate various di¤erences which most interest us and conduct Wald tests on
these estimates. In particular, we examine the extent to which di¤erences in previous actions
and previous outcomes a¤ect the yards gained by a play of a particular type: rush or pass.
In other words, we do not compare the di¤erences in the yards gained on a pass play and a
rush play, rather we restrict attention to a particular play type and investigate whether past
actions and past outcomes a¤ect the yards gained. This analysis and the regression statistics
from Table A1 are summarized in Table 6.
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Table 6 Estimates of the di¤erence in yards gained between a
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rush following a rush and 0:138 0:134 0:129 0:148
a rush following a pass (0:0674) (0:0683) (0:0679) (0:0698)
Pass following a pass and 0:211 0:234 0:206 0:236
a pass following a rush (0:0511) (0:0520) (0:0522) (0:0532)
Rush following a failed rush and 0:238 0:227 0:211 0:249
a rush following a failed pass (0:118) (0:120) (0:119) (0:123)
Rush following a non-failed rush and 0:0368 0:0413 0:0469 0:0472
a rush following a non-failed pass (0:0646) (0:0651) (0:0654) (0:0666)
Pass following a failed pass and 0:0834 0:107 0:0642 0:0771
a pass following a failed rush (0:0776) (0:0790) (0:0794) (0:0808)
Pass following a non-failed pass and 0:338 0:362 0:348 0:394
a pass following a non-failed rush (0:0660) (0:0670) (0:0670) (0:0685)
R2 0:05 0:05 0:05 0:05
F-value 24:89 24:42 24:23 23:28
Observations 209; 963 203; 791 202; 329 194; 860
These comparisons are based on the analysis summarized in Table A1. Based
on the Wald test of the estimates,  indicates signicance at p < 0:1,  indicates
signicance at p < 0:01, and  indicates signicance at p < 0:001.
First we note that there are no negative estimates in Table 6. In other words, given any
of the situations which we consider, there is no evidence that running the same play type as
the previous play presents a disadvantage in terms of yards gained. The rst two rows only
consider the play type and not whether the previous play was a failure. We nd that a rush
play following a rush play gains 0:13  0:15 yards more than a rush play following a pass play.
We also nd that a pass play following a pass play gains 0:21   0:24 yards more than a pass
play following a rush play. We note that the estimates can be more pronounced when we also
consider whether the previous play was a failure. We nd that a rush play gains 0:21  0:25
yards more following a failed rush play than following a failed pass play. We also nd that
a pass play gains 0:34   0:39 yards more following a non-failed pass play than following a
non-failed rush play. To summarize, we nd evidence that the e¢ cacy of a play, as measured
by yards gained, increases if it follows a play of the same type. This is not consistent with
minimax.
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3.4 Serial correlation and success
Whereas we previously examined whether the serial correlation a¤ected the yards gained by
a play, it is possible that this measure does not completely capture the e¢ cacy of a play.
Therefore, we perform an analysis similar to that summarized in Table A1, however we use a
dependent variable which assumes a value of 1 if the play is successful, and a 0 otherwise. Since
the dependent variable is binary, we employ logistic regressions. We include the identical set of
independent variables as the analysis summarized in Table A1. This analysis is summarized
in Table A2, in the appendix. Given the analysis summarized in Table A2, we estimate
the di¤erences which most interest us and conduct Wald tests on these estimates. These
comparisons are done in the same manner as Table 6. We summarize these comparisons and
present the the regression statistics from Table A2 in Table 7.
Table 7 Di¤erence in success estimates between a
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rush following a rush and 0:123 0:127 0:112 0:114
a rush following a pass (0:0176) (0:0178) (0:0177) (0:0182)
Pass following a pass and 0:0274 0:0320 0:0279 0:0374
a pass following a rush (0:0131) (0:0133) (0:0133) (0:0136)
Rush following a failed rush and 0:251 0:258 0:240 0:246
a rush following a failed pass (0:0313) (0:0318) (0:0314) (0:0324)
Rush following a non-failed rush and  0:0055  0:0041  0:0169  0:0172
a rush following a non-failed pass (0:0160) (0:0162) (0:0162) (0:0165)
Pass following a failed pass and 0:0110 0:0139 0:0094 0:0203
a pass following a failed rush (0:0202) (0:0206) (0:0207) (0:0210)
Pass following a non-failed pass and 0:0437 0:0500 0:0465 0:0545
a pass following a non-failed rush (0:0165) (0:0167) (0:0167) (0:0171)
 2 Log L 269807:43 262498:12 260592:96 251358:09
Observations 209; 963 203; 791 202; 329 194; 860
These comparisons are based on the analysis summarized in Table A2. Based
on the Wald test of the estimates,  indicates signicance at p < 0:1,  indicates
signicance at p < 0:01, and  indicates signicance at p < 0:001.
We note that there are no signicant and negative estimates in Table 7, again suggesting
that plays are more successful when they follow plays of the same type. Additionally, as
we found earlier, our results become more pronounced when we condition on the possibility
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that the previous play was a failure. We nd that a rush play is signicantly more likely
to be successful when following a failed rush play than when following a failed pass play.
Additionally, we nd that a pass play following a non-failed pass play is signicantly more
likely to be successful than a pass play following a non-failed rush play. Similar to Table 6,
the analysis summarized in Table 7 provides evidence that the e¢ cacy of plays are a¤ected
by previous actions and previous outcomes.
3.5 Analysis of second down
In the analysis above, we examined plays that occurred on each of the four downs. However, it
is possible that behavior is su¢ ciently di¤erent across downs, so we analyze downs individually.
We begin with second down, as second down always follows a particular down (rst down)
and there is a variation in the failure of the previous play. We conduct an analysis identical
to that summarized in Table 5, restricting our attention to second down. We summarize this
analysis in Table 8.
Table 8 Logistic regressions of serial correlation: Play is a pass on second down
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Previous pass  0:485  0:492  0:493  0:503
(0:00819) (0:00830) (0:00831) (0:00843)
Previous failure  0:0550  0:0588  0:0556  0:0787
(0:0107) (0:0110) (0:0108) (0:0114)
Previous pass * Previous failure  0:157  0:161  0:169  0:176
(0:00806) (0:00817) (0:00817) (0:00830)
 2 Log L 107882:13 105333:39 105310:64 102911:80
LR 2 12083:64 11802:50 11818:37 11642:38
Observations 86; 645 84; 574 84; 569 82; 683
We do not list the estimates of the other independent variables, the estimate
of the intercept, or the estimates of the team-season xed-e¤ects. Note that 
indicates signicance at p < 0:1,  indicates signicance at p < 0:01, and 
indicates signicance at p < 0:001.
First, we note that the Previous pass coe¢ cients are negative and signicant at 0:001,
implying that a pass is signicantly less likely to be called following a pass. Therefore, similar
to the analysis summarized in Table 5, here we nd evidence of negative serial correlation.
17
Also similar to Table 5, we nd that the Previous pass-Previous failure interaction is negative
and signicant. This suggests that a pass on second down is even less likely after a failed pass
on rst down. However, unlike what was found in Table 5, here we nd that the Previous
failure coe¢ cients are negative and signicant at 0:001.
Next we investigate whether the negative serial correlation on second down e¤ects the
e¢ cacy of plays. We conduct an analysis, similar to that summarized in Table A2, including
only second down. This analysis is summarized in Table A3, in the appendix. Also similar to
the analysis summarized in Table 6, here we estimate various di¤erences found in the analysis.
This analysis and the regression statistics from Table A3 are summarized in Table 9.
Table 9 Estimates of the di¤erence in yards gained on second down between a
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rush following a rush and 0:239 0:243 0:237 0:246
a rush following a pass (0:0857) (0:0865) (0:0870) (0:08742)
Pass following a pass and 0:452 0:459 0:443 0:441
a pass following a rush (0:0851) (0:0865) (0:0860) (0:0872)
Rush following a failed rush and 0:389 0:394 0:376 0:399
a rush following a failed pass (0:1328) (0:134) (0:136) (0:137)
Rush following a non-failed rush and 0:0886 0:0913 0:0985 0:0924
a rush following a non-failed pass (0:107) (0:108) (0:108) (0:108)
Pass following a failed pass and 0:315 0:347 0:288 0:312
a pass following a failed rush (0:108) (0:110) (0:111) (0:113)
Pass following a non-failed pass and 0:589 0:572 0:598 0:571
a pass following a non-failed rush (0:131) (0:133) (0:131) (0:133)
R2 0:05 0:05 0:05 0:05
F-value 10:38 10:19 10:18 10:07
Observations 86; 645 84; 574 84; 569 82; 683
These comparisons are based on the analysis summarized in Table A3. Based
on the Wald test of the estimates,  indicates signicance at p < 0:1,  indicates
signicance at p < 0:01, and  indicates signicance at p < 0:001.
Similar to that found in Table 6, we do not nd a signicant and negative estimate of the
di¤erence in yards gained on second down. Indeed, comparing Table 6 to Table 9 we see that
the latter either has larger coe¢ cient estimates or lower p-values of the estimates. Whereas
Table 6 only has 2 of the 6 conditions that are signicant at 0:01 in all four specications,
Table 9 has 5 of the 6 situations that are signicant at 0:01 in all four specications. We
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also nd that a rush play following a rush play gains 0:24   0:25 yards more than a rush
play following a pass play. Additionally, a pass play following a pass play gains 0:44   0:46
more yards than a pass play following a rush play. As in the previous analyses, estimates
can become more pronounced when we also consider whether the previous play was a failure.
A rush play gains 0:38   0:40 yards more following a failed rush play than following a failed
pass play. Further, a pass play gains 0:57  0:60 yards more following a non-failed pass play
than following a non-failed rush play. We also conduct the analogous analysis consisting of
the success measure, rather than the yards gained measure, on second down plays.22 Similar
to Table 7, we do not nd a negative and signicant estimate, except in a single condition.23
In summary, we nd evidence of serial correlation of plays called on second down and that
second down plays are more successful following plays of the same type. Again, this is not
consistent with minimax.
3.6 Analysis of third down
We now examine whether there is serial correlation on third down plays. Like second down,
the down before third down is known (second down) and there is variation in the failure of
the previous play. This analysis is conducted in the same manner as that summarized in
Table 8, with the exception that we restrict attention to third down plays. We summarize
this analysis in Table 10.
22This is available from the corresponding author upon request.
23We nd that there is a negative di¤erence in the estimate of the probability of success of a rush following
a non-failed rush and the probability of success of a rush following a non-failed pass, which is signicant at 0:1
in all four specications.
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Table 10 Logistic regressions of serial correlation: Play is a pass on third down
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Previous pass  0:0220  0:0293  0:0264  0:0303
(0:0117) (0:0120) (0:0120) (0:0122)
Previous failure 0:0797 0:0674 0:0711 0:0605
(0:0125) (0:0129) (0:0129) (0:0130)
Previous pass * Previous failure 0:00765  0:00191 0:000095  0:00455
(0:0117) (0:0120) (0:0120) (0:0121)
 2 Log L 50204:85 48088:12 48060:55 47060:99
LR 2 6648:84 6905:33 6929:35 7033:16
Observations 54; 922 52; 815 52; 813 51; 862
We do not list the estimates of the other independent variables, the estimate
of the intercept, or the estimates of the team-season xed-e¤ects. Note that 
indicates signicance at p < 0:1,  indicates signicance at p < 0:01, and 
indicates signicance at p < 0:001.
Here we nd some evidence of negative serial correlation on third down plays, although
these estimates are signicant only at 0:1. However, we nd some di¤erences from the previous
analyses of serial correlation found in Tables 5 and 8. First, the Previous pass-Previous
failure interaction is not signicant in any of our specications. Further, the Previous failure
coe¢ cient is positive and signicant in all for specications. In other words, when the previous
play on second down was a failure, a pass is signicantly more likely to be called on third down.
While we nd some evidence of negative serial correlation among play calling on third
down, we now investigate whether this serial correlation a¤ects the e¢ cacy of third down
plays. We conduct an analysis similar to that in the previous subsection, however we restrict
attention to third down plays. The analysis is summarized in Table A4, in the appendix. We
also estimate the relevant di¤erences, as in the analysis summarized in Tables 6 and 9. We
summarize this analysis, in addition to the regression statistics from Table A4, in Table 11.
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Table 11 Estimates of the di¤erence in yards gained on third down between a
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rush following a rush and  0:101  0:131  0:133  0:135
a rush following a pass (0:180) (0:182) (0:183) (0:185)
Pass following a pass and 0:0331 0:0520 0:0260 0:0464
a pass following a rush (0:0940) (0:0957) (0:0953) (0:0964)
Rush following a failed rush and  0:324  0:390  0:406  0:397
a rush following a failed pass (0:279) (0:285) (0:287) (0:290)
Rush following a non-failed rush and 0:122 0:128 0:140 0:128
a rush following a non-failed pass (0:227) (0:228) (0:227) (0:228)
Pass following a failed pass and  0:141  0:115  0:149  0:128
a pass following a failed rush (0:124) (0:127) (0:127) (0:129)
Pass following a non-failed pass and 0:207 0:219 0:201 0:221
a pass following a non-failed rush (0:140) (0:142) (0:141) (0:143)
R2 0:05 0:06 0:06 0:06
F-value 7:17 7:02 7:02 6:90
Observations 54; 922 52; 815 52; 813 51; 862
These comparisons are based on the analysis summarized in Table A4. Based
on the Wald test of the estimates,  indicates signicance at p < 0:1,  indicates
signicance at p < 0:01, and  indicates signicance at p < 0:001.
We note that unlike Tables 6 and 9, Table 11 does not contain a single signicant rela-
tionship. In other words, the weak evidence of negative serial correlation found in Table 10
does not appear to a¤ect the e¢ cacy of third down plays. We also note that the analogous
analysis consisting of the success of the play, rather than the yards gained, is qualitatively
similar to that of Table 11.24 Given the lack of evidence of an e¤ect of the serial correlation
on third down plays, the results unrestricted by down, found in Tables 6 and 7, are all the
more surprising.
4 Conclusion
We analyze play calling in 3455 National Football League games from the 2000 season through
the 2012 season. We categorize every relevant play as either a pass or a rush. We nd that
the play calling exhibits negative serial correlation. In other words, we nd evidence that
24The one exception is that there is a positive di¤erence in the estimate of the probability of success of a
rush following a failed rush and the probability of success of a rush following a failed pass, which is signicant
at 0:1 in all four specications. This is available from the corresponding author upon request.
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the type of play called is a¤ected by the previous type of play and that the play types switch
more than that implied by an independent stochastic process.
We also nd that the e¢ cacy of plays are a¤ected by previous actions and previous out-
comes in a manner that is not consistent with minimax. In particular, we nd that a rush
play following a rush play earns more yards and is more likely to be successful than a rush
play following a pass play. Similarly, we nd that a pass play following a pass play earns
more yards and is more likely to be successful than a pass play following a rush play. Given
that the yards and success measures exhibit very di¤erent properties, it should be all the
more surprising that their qualitative implications regarding the e¤ects of serial correlation
are similar. Further, we nd that these di¤erences can become more pronounced when we
also consider whether the previous play was a failure.
We also conduct an analysis of serial correlation separately by down. We nd evidence
that plays on second down exhibit negative serial correlation and that the e¤ects of the serial
correlation are pronounced. However, when we restrict attention to third down, we only
nd weak evidence of negative serial correlation and we do not nd evidence that this serial
correlation a¤ects the outcomes of third down plays. Therefore, it seems that our results are
driven by second down behavior, and not third down behavior.
What are we to make of our results? How could it be the case that experienced decision
makers under large material incentives for success, with the ability to make detailed plans
prior to the decision, and who could consult others in the decision exhibit behavior that is not
consistent with minimax?
A possible explanation for our ndings of serial correlation is that the play calling switches
too often because of the fatigue of the players involved in the play. This is a possible
explanation of the negative serial correlation of plays but it does not explain the results
regarding the e¢ cacy of plays. In particular, we nd that there is a positive benet when
two consecutive plays are of the same type rather than when the two consecutive plays are
di¤erent types. Therefore, the material e¤ects of fatigue cannot explain our results. It is
possible that di¤erences in the perception of fatigue by the o¤ense and defense could explain
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our results. However, it is di¢ cult for us to see how these di¤erences in the perception of
fatigue could be su¢ ciently and systematically di¤erent to explain our results.
Another possible explanation follows from the research that indicates that people have dif-
culty producing independent, random sequences.25 Whereas this could explain the negative
serial correlation of play calling, it cannot explain the reduced e¢ cacy of plays associated with
the serial correlation. The latter is consistent with the claim that the defense expects the
play calling of the o¤ense to excessively switch play type.
It is possible that there are excessive computational di¢ culties in accurately mixing. The
teams must not simply decide to rush or to pass but rather which of the several hundred
pass or rush plays to execute. Perhaps the e¤ects of these computational di¢ culties could
explain our results.26 While this can explain the negative serial correlation of play calling, it
is not clear why the lower e¢ cacy associated with the negative serial correlation would be so
persistent.
Finally, it is possible that the teams feel pressure not to repeat the play type on o¤ense,
in order to avoid criticism for being too "predictable" by people who have di¢ culty detecting
whether outcomes of a sequence are statistically independent. Further, perhaps this concern
is su¢ ciently important so that teams accept the negative consequences that arise from the
risk that the defense can detect a pattern in their mixing.27 This explanation is reminiscent
of the Action bias found by Bar-Eli et al. (2007). The explanation that teams do not want
to be viewed as predictable and accept the reduction in the e¢ cacy of their plays which result
from the negative serial correlation seems to be the explanation most consistent with our data.
25See Wagenaar (1972), Bar-Hillel, and Wagenaar (1991), Rabin (2002), and Oskarsson, Van Boven, Mc-
Clelland, and Hastie (2009).
26For instance, see Halpern and Pass (2014).
27See Shachat and Swarthout (2004) and Spiliopoulos (2012).
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Appendix
Table A1 Regressions of yards gained
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pass 1:715 1:729 1:738 1:724
(0:0639) (0:0646) (0:0648) (0:0662)
Previous failure 0:470 0:449 0:439 0:419
(0:0964) (0:0982) (0:0963) (0:101)
Same play type as previous 0:0368 0:0413 0:0469 0:0472
(0:0646) (0:0651) (0:0654) (0:0666)
Pass * Previous failure  0:515  0:531  0:506  0:501
(0:112) (0:114) (0:113) (0:116)
Previous failure * Same 0:202 0:186 0:164 0:201
(0:135) (0:137) (0:136) (0:140)
Pass * Same 0:301 0:321 0:301 0:347
(0:0951) (0:0962) (0:0961) (0:0982)
Pass * Previous failure * Same  0:456  0:441  0:448  0:518
(0:171) (0:173) (0:173) (0:177)
R2 0:05 0:05 0:05 0:05
F-value 24:89 24:42 24:23 23:28
Observations 209; 963 203; 791 202; 329 194; 860
We do not list the estimates of the other independent variables, the estimate
of the intercept, or the estimates of the team-season xed-e¤ects. Note that 
indicates signicance at p < 0:1,  indicates signicance at p < 0:01, and 
indicates signicance at p < 0:001.
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Table A2 Logistic regressions of a successful play
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pass 0:0149 0:0097 0:0043  0:0032
(0:0159) (0:0161) (0:0162) (0:0165)
Previous Failure  0:291  0:294  0:281  0:267
(0:0254) (0:0260) (0:0254) (0:0267)
Same play type as Previous  0:0055  0:0041  0:0169  0:0172
(0:0160) (0:0162) (0:0162) (0:0165)
Pass * Previous Failure 0:373 0:376 0:378 0:389
(0:0293) (0:0297) (0:0295) (0:0303)
Previous Failure * Same 0:256 0:262 0:257 0:263
(0:0352) (0:0357) (0:0354) (0:0364)
Pass * Same 0:0492 0:0541 0:0634 0:0717
(0:0237) (0:0240) (0:0240) (0:0245)
Pass * Previous Failure * Same  0:289  0:299  0:294  0:297
(0:0442) (0:0449) (0:0446) (0:0458)
 2 Log L 269807:43 262498:12 260592:96 251358:09
Observations 209; 963 203; 791 202; 329 194; 860
We do not list the estimates of the other independent variables, the estimate
of the intercept, or the estimates of the team-season xed-e¤ects.. Note that 
indicates signicance at p < 0:1,  indicates signicance at p < 0:01, and 
indicates signicance at p < 0:001.
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Table A3 Regressions of yards gained on second down
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pass 1:671 1:686 1:680 1:686
(0:108) (0:109) (0:108) (0:109)
Previous failure 0:209 0:205 0:207 0:200
(0:131) (0:134) (0:132) (0:136)
Same play type as previous 0:0886 0:0913 0:0985 0:0924
(0:107) (0:108) (0:108) (0:108)
Pass * Previous failure  0:200  0:225  0:204  0:210
(0:1500) (0:152) (0:152) (0:153)
Previous failure * Same 0:301 0:302 0:278 0:306
(0:170) (0:172) (0:173) (0:174)
Pass * Same 0:501 0:480 0:499 0:478
(0:171) (0:173) (0:171) (0:173)
Pass * Previous failure * Same  0:575  0:527  0:587  0:565
(0:242) (0:245) (0:245) (0:248)
R2 0:05 0:05 0:05 0:05
F-value 10:38 10:19 10:18 10:07
Observations 86; 645 84; 574 84; 569 82; 683
We do not list the estimates of the other independent variables, the estimate
of the intercept, or the estimates of the team-season xed-e¤ects. Note that 
indicates signicance at p < 0:1,  indicates signicance at p < 0:01, and 
indicates signicance at p < 0:001.
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Table A4 Regressions of yards gained on third down
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pass 1:050 1:097 1:107 1:092
(0:201) (0:203) (0:202) (0:203)
Previous failure 1:348 1:359 1:382 1:376
(0:269) (0:273) (0:274) (0:277)
Same play type as previous 0:122 0:128 0:140 0:127
(0:227) (0:228) (0:227) (0:228)
Pass * Previous failure  1:208  1:286  1:297  1:287
(0:295) (0:299) (0:301) (0:304)
Previous failure * Same  0:446  0:517  0:546  0:525
(0:359) (0:364) (0:365) (0:369)
Pass * Same 0:0852 0:0912 0:0609 0:0938
(0:267) (0:269) (0:268) (0:270)
Pass * Previous failure * Same 0:0975 0:184 0:196 0:175
(0:407) (0:414) (0:414) (0:418)
R2 0:05 0:06 0:06 0:06
F-value 7:17 7:02 7:02 6:90
Observations 54; 922 52; 815 52; 813 51; 862
We do not list the estimates of the other independent variables, the estimate
of the intercept, or the estimates of the team-season xed-e¤ects. Note that 
indicates signicance at p < 0:1,  indicates signicance at p < 0:01, and 
indicates signicance at p < 0:001.
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